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Abstract
We search for (Nash) implementable solutions on a class of one-to-one
matching problems which includes both the housing market (Shapley and
Scarf 1974) and marriage problems (Gale and Shapley 1962). We show that
the core correspondence is implementable. We furthermore show that any
solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable is a
supersolution of the core correspondence. That is, the core correspondence is
the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and imple-
mentable. A corollary of independent interest in the context of the housing
market is that the core correspondence is the only single-valued solution that
is Pareto-efficient, individually rational, and implementable.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71, D78.
Key Words: Matching Problems, Marriage Problems, Housing Market, Implemen-
tation, Stable Matchings, Core.
*This paper is based on the sixth chapter of my dissertation that was submitted to the De-
partment of Economics, University of Rochester. I wish to thank Professor William Thomson for
his efforts in supervision as well as his useful suggestions. I am grateful to Tank Kara, James
Schuminer and two anonymous referees for their comments. All errors are my own responsibility.
The main objective of the mechanism design literature is providing "reasonable"
solutions to public decision problems. When evaluating a candidate solution, one
of the questions most often asked is whether the solution is strategy-proof. That is,
do agents always have the incentive to be truthful about their preferences. Unfortu-
nately, in most contexts it is not an easy task to find a strategy-proof solution which
also satisfies some minimal normative properties.
1 As far as matching problems are
concerned there are both positive and negative results. Consider the housing market
(Shapley and Scarf 1974). In this model each agent owns one indivisible good, say
a house, and has preferences over the houses held by all agents in the economy. An
allocation here is a permutation of the houses among the agents. Roth and Postle-
waite (1977) show that the core correspondence is single-valued, and Roth (1982a)
shows that it is strategy-proof. Furthermore, Ma (1994a) shows that it is the only
solution to be Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof. Another
class of matching problems that has been extensively studied is the class of marriage
problems2 (Gale and Shapley 1962). Here, there are two finite disjoint sets of agents
interpreted as a set of men and a set of women. Each man has a preference relation
over the set of women and staying single. Similarly each woman has a preference
relation over the set of men and staying single. An allocation is a matching of men
and women. Gale and Shapley (1962) show that the core correspondence is well-
defined, that is, the core of each marriage problem is non-empty. Unfortunately, the
results concerning strategy-proofness in marriage problems are quite discouraging.
Roth (1992b) shows that there is no selection from the core correspondence that is
strategy-proof. Moreover Alcalde and Barbera (1994) show that there is no solution
that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof.
'Strategy-proofness was first analyzed in abstract social choice models where there are few or
no restrictions on preferences. Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) show that, under minor
conditions strategy-proofness is equivalent to dictatorship. See Sprumont (1994), and Thomson
(1994) for recent surveys of the literature on strategy-proofness.
2See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for an exposition of game theoretic modelling and analysis of
marriage problems and two-sided matching problems in general.
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Motivated by such different results in two apparently similar class of problems,
Sonmez (1994b) introduces the class of generalized matching problems (which include
both the marriage problems and the housing market) and studies strategy-proofness
in this class. He shows that there exists a solution that is Pareto efficient, individ-
ually rational, and strategy-proof only if the core correspondence is single-valued.
Furthermore if such a solution exists, it is the core correspondence itself.
3 
This
result has both positive and negative implications. On the positive side, it pro-
vides important non-cooperative support for the core correspondence, a cooperative
solution. Yet, it once again highlights the difficulties in obtaining strategy-proof
solutions since often it is not the case that the core correspondence is single-valued.
For that reason in this paper we weaken the incentive requirement and ask the fol-
lowing question in the context of generalized matching problems: Is it possible to
construct a game form such that at equilibrium the desired matchings are obtained
in spite of the fact that agents may behave strategically. The equilibrium notion we
consider is the Nash equilibrium. Using the language of mechanism design, we are
searching for (Nash) implementable solutions.
4
Due to the negative results of Roth (1982b) and Alcalde and Barbera (1994),
Kara and Sonmez (1993) search for implementable solutions for marriage problems.
They show that the core correspondence is implementable. Furthermore, they show
that any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable
is a supersolution of the core correspondence. That is, the core correspondence is
the minimal implementable solution to be Pareto efficient and individually rational."
In this paper we generalize the results of Kara and S6nmez (1993) to the class of
generalized matching problems. A corollary of these general results in the context of
the housing market is that the core correspondence is the only single-valued solution
that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.
3
Sonmez (1994a) obtains analogous results in the context of many-to-one matching problems.
4See Maskin (1985), Moore (1992), and Thomson (1993) for expositions of implementation
theory.
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See also Alcalde (1994) and Ma (1994b) for implementation results in marriage problems via
refinements of Nash equilibrium.
In this paper we show that one needs to consider the core correspondence as
a whole as long as he/she is interested in implementation of Pareto efficient and
individually rational solutions to generalized matching problems. As a consequence
we also identify the loss entailed in obtaining implementability as well as Pareto
efficiency and individual rationality: Single-valuedness. We believe these results
provide further non-cooperative support to the core correspondence, a cooperative
solution.
2 Preliminaries
We will divide this section into two subsections. The first of these subsections deals
with implementation and related concepts in general mechanism design framework.
The second subsection deals with generalized matching problems.
2.1 Implementation
The set of alternatives is A. The set of agents is N = {1,2,...,n}. For each
agent i E N, R; is the set of possible preference relations. Here each R; E 1Z; is a
complete (for all a, b E A we have aRfb or bRia) and transitive (for all a, b, c E A
we have aR~b and bRjc implies aRic) binary relation on A. Let Z = fleN 1Z. The
lower contour set of R, at a E A is L(a, R;) = {b e A I aRb}.
A solution is a correspondence V : R -+ A. Here each alternative a E p(R) is
interpreted as a desirable allocation when the preference profile is R. A preference
profile R is obtained by a monotonic transformation of R at a E A, if L(a, R,) C
L(a, RE) for all i E N. Let MT(R, a) denote the set of preference profiles which are
obtained by a monotonic transformation of R at a. A solution W is monotonic if
for all R, R JZ, and for all a E p(R), if f ? MT(R, a), then a E (R). That is, a
solution is monotonic if whenever an alternative a is selected for a preference profile
R and the ranking of a improves for all agents under another preference profile A (in
the sense that no alternative that is weakly worse under R is strictly better under
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R) a is also selected under R. A solution 'p satisfies no veto power if, for all i E N,
and for all R E 7Z, if A = L(a, R3) for all j E N \ {i}, then a E p(R).
A game form is a pair r = (X, h) = (JijEN X, h), where X; is agent i's strategy
space, and h : X -+ A is an outcome function. The pair (F, R) defines a game.
Let NE(I, R) denote the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria for the game (t, R).
The game form F implements the solution 'p (in Nash equilibria), if h(NE(F, R)) =
p(R) for all R E R.
Maskin (1977) shows that monotonicity is a necessary condition for imple-
mentability. He further shows that monotonicity and no veto power together are
sufficient for implementability.' Recently there has been a number of studies iden-
tifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for implementability. Some of these
studies are Moore and Repullo (1990), Dutta and Sen (1991), Sjostrom (1991),
Danilov (1992), and Yamato (1992). Here we present the results due to Danilov
(1992) and Yamato (1992).
Let 'p : R - A and B C A. An alternative b E L(a, Ri) is essential for agent
i E N for ' if
3RD E RZ L(b, Ri) G L(a, Ri) and b E 'p(R*)
That is an alternative b in the lower contour set of R; at a is essential for agent i for
yo if we can find a preference profile R* where any alternative that is strictly better
than a under R, is also better than b under R; and b is selected for the preference
profile R*. We denote the set of essential alternatives for agent i E N in L(a, Ri) for
'p by E('p, i, L(a, R,)). A rule 'p is essentially monotonic if for all R, N E R and
for all a E 'p(R), if E('p,i, L(a, Re)) C L(a,Ri) for all i E N, then a E 'p(R). Thus
a solution 'p is essentially monotonic if whenever an alternative a is selected for a
preference profile R and it is weakly preferred to all essential elements in L(a, Ri)
under R, it is selected for the preference profile R.
Danilov (1992) introduces the concept of essential monotonicity and shows that if
INS > 3 then a solution 'p is implementable if and only if it is essentially monotonic.
Danilov proves this result on a domain where preferences are linear orders on A.
6See also Williams (1986) and Saijo (1988).
Yamato (1992) generalizes this result as follows: Let R be such that, for all a E A,
R E R, i E N, and b E L(a, Ri), there exists if E R such that L(b, R) = L(a, R;)
and for all j It i, L(b, R') = A. Then, if |N ;> 3, a solution ' is implementable if
and only if it is essentially monotonic.
2.2 Generalized Matching Problems
A (generalized) matching problem is a triple G = (N, S, R). The first com-
ponent N is a finite set of agents. The second component S = (Si)iEN is a list
of subsets of N with i E Si for all i E N. Here Si represents the set of possible
assignments for agent i. The last component R = (Ri)iEN is a list of preference
relations. Let P denote the strict relation associated with the preference relation
R; for all i E N. The preference relation R; of each agent i E N is reflexive (for all
j E S; we have jRij), transitive, and total (for all j, k E Si we have jRik or kRij
but not both). Such preference relations are referred to as linear orders. Let R,
be the class of linear orders on Si and R = HiEN R. We consider the case where
N and S are fixed and hence to define a matching problem it suffices to specify a
preference profile.
A (generalized) matching y is a function from the set N into itself such that
1. Vi EN p(i)ESi,
2. Vi E N Ip 1 (i)| = 1.
Note that p is a bijection on N. For all i E N, we refer to p(i) as the assignment
of i at p. We denote the set of all matchings by M. Let pt E M be defined by
PI(i) = i for all i E N. We exogenously specify a subset M/ of the set of matchings
M as the set of feasible matchings. We always require that pi E M'. In the
context of matching problems the set of allocations A is the set of feasible matchings
M1 . Given a preference relation R; of an agent i E N, initially defined over S;, we
extend it to the set of feasible matchings M
1 in the following natural way: agent i
prefers the matching p to the matching p' if and only if he prefers his assignment
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under p to his assignment under p'. We slightly abuse the notation and also use R=
to denote this extension.
Two extensively studied subclasses of generalized matching problems are the
housing market (Shapley and Scarf 1974) and the marriage problems (Gale
and Shapley 1962). In the housing market each agent owns one house and has
preferences over the houses held by all agents. An allocation is a permutation of
the houses among the agents. In the marriage problems there are two sets of agents
the set of men M and the set of women W. Each man has preferences over the set
of woman and staying single. Similarly each woman has preferences over the set of
men and staying single. An allocation here is a matching of men and women (where
agents may end up being single). If we specify S; = N for all i E N and M
1 = M
we obtain the housing market as a subclass of generalized matching problems. If
we specify N = M U W where M and W are two finite, non-empty, disjoint sets,
Smn= W U {m} for all m E M, Sw, = MU {w} for all w E W, and
M' = {p E MI p(p(i)) = i for all i E N}
we obtain the marriage problems as a subclass of generalized problems.
A matching p E M1 is individually rational under R if p(i)Rii for all i E N.
We denote the set of all individually rational matchings under R by 1(R).
A matching p E M 1 is Pareto efficient under R if there is no other matching
p' E M 1 such that p'(i)Rip(i) for all i E N and p'(j)Pp(j) for some j E N. We
denote the set of all Pareto efficient matchings under R by P(R).
A matching p' E M 1 dominates the matching p E M' via a coalition T C N
under R if
1. Vi E T p'(i) E T,
2. Vi E T p'(i)Rip(i),
3. 3j E T p'(j)Pjp(j)-
In that case we say the coalition T blocks p under R. A matching p E M
1 is in
the core of the matching problem R E R if it is not dominated by any matching.
We denote the core of R by C(R). In the context of matching problems we refer to
solutions as matching rules. A matching rule W is Pareto efficient if '(R) 'P(R)
for all R E R, and individually rational if p(R) C 1(R) for all R E R.
3 Results
Throughout this paper we assume that N, S, M1 are such that the core is non-
empty for all preference profiles. Let C be the matching rule which selects the set
of matchings in the core for each preference profile. We will refer to the matching
rule C as the core correspondence. The first proposition concerns the monotonicity
of the core correspondence.
Proposition 1: The core correspondence is monotonic.
Proof: Suppose C is not monotonic. Then there exists R, R E R and p E C(R) with
L(p, R,) C L(p, RN) for all i E N but p $ C(R). Hence there exists T C N and
p' E M
1 
such that
1.ViET p'(i)ET,
2. Vi E T p'(i)Nip(i),
3. 3j E T p'(j)Pp(j).
This implies p'(i)Rip(i) for all i E T as L(p, R;) G L(p,JR;) for all i E N. We
also have p'(j) # p(j) and the preferences are strict therefore p'(j)R3p(j) implies
p'(j)Pjp(j) and therefore
1. Vi E T p'(i) E T,
2. Vi C T p'(i)Rip(i),
3. 3j E T p'(j)Pp(j).
contradicting u C C(R). Q.E.D.
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Our first Theorem concerns monotonic rules that are Pareto efficient and indi-
vidually rational.
Theorem 1: Let p be a Pareto efficient, individually rational, and monotonic
matching rule. Then ;D C. Proof: Let R E R and y E C(R). We need to show
that p E p(R). Let R E R be such that for all i E N
1. jPj!k <=* jPik for all j,k ES; \{i},
2. p(i)Rgi and ,Aj E Si \ {i,p(i)} with p(i)RgjRi.
Note that R' E MT(R, p) and p E C(R). Therefore p E C(R') by Proposition 1. We
also have R E MT(R',p).
Let v E M' be such that v E I(M). Let ii E N. Let |NI= n. Let ik+1 = v(ik)
for all k E {1,2,...,n}.
Suppose
i 2PI, p(ij) (1)
Therefore
v(ik) = ik+1P,'ik for all k E {2, 3,..., l}
as v(R') E 1(R'), and hence
v(ik) = ik+iR p(ik) for all k E {2,3,...,1} (3)
by construction. We have i1+i = v(ii) (V{i1,i 2 ,...,i1}. But v(i) = ik+1 for all
k E {1,2,...,l} and v is a bijection therefore v(ii+i) V {i 2,.. ,i+1}. We either
have v(ia1+) = i1 or v(i1+1) # i1. If the former holds v E 1(R) implies i1P,i 11
and hence
i1 R 1 II(il+l )
(4)
by the construction of R . But then the coalition {i, i2,..., iti} blocks p under
R' by relations (1), (3), and (4) contradicting p E C(R). Therefore v(i1 i) 
{ii,i 2 ,...,i+1}. Hence v(in) V {ii,i 2,... ,i~} by induction.
We have
i2 = v(ii) {ii}
i3 = v(i2) {ii, i2}We will show that
v(ik) V {i,i 2,...,)ik} for all k E {2,3,... ,n}
by induction on k. Let us first show v(i 2) 9 {ii,i 2}. We have i2 V {i 1,p(i 1)} by
relation (1) and the construction of R,. Therefore v(i2) # i2 (i2 # i1, v(i1) = i2,
and (v-'(i 2)|= 1).
We either have v(i 2) = ii or v(i2) # ii. If the former holds v E I(R') implies
i P42i2 and hence
i1R'.2p(is) (2)
by the construction of R,,. But then the coalition {ii, i2} blocks y under R by
relations (1) and (2) contradicting p E C(Ri). Therefore v(i) {i1,1 2}.
Next suppose v(ik) l {il,i 2,...,ik} for all k E {2,3,. .. ,1} with 2 < 1 < n.
Then we have
(ik)= ik+i#ik for all kE {2,3,...,1}
in = v(in_1) g {i1,1i2, ... , in--1 }
Therefore i # ik for all j,k E N with j 0 k which implies {i 1,i 2,- .-.- ,in} = N.
Thus, v(in) % N contradicting v E M!. Hence p(i1 )R, v(ii) = i2. That is
Vi E N, v E 1(R') p(i)Ra'v(i)
and therefore
P(R') n 1(R') = {p}
which implies
cp(R') = {p}
We also have R E MT(Ri, p) and p is monotonic, therefore p E p(R). Q.E.D.
Remark 1: Theorem 1 also hold for cases where the core correspondence is not well-
defined in the sense that any rule that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and
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implementable should select all the matchings in the core whenever it is non-empty.
One such class of problems is the roommate problems (Gale and Shapley 1962):
There is a group of agents each of whom has strict preferences over all agents. An
allocation is a partition of the set of agents into groups of size one and two. Here we
are assigning either one or two persons to a room. We obtain roommate problems
as generalized matching problems as follows: Let S; = N for all i E N and
M' = {p E M I|p(p(i)) = i for all i E N}
Consider the following example: N = {i,j,k}, jPkPi, kPsiPj, iPkjPkk. Note
that in this problem staying single is each agent's last choice and each agent is
someone else's first choice. Therefore whoever stays single in a matching will form a
coalition to block this matching. Hence C(R) = 0. It is straightforward constructing
roomate problems with non-empty core.
Theorem 1 shows that if we have any hope of implementing a Pareto efficient
and individually rational matching rule it is the core and its supersolutions. The
next natural question is whether the core correspondence is implementable. The
core correspondence is monotonic by Proposition 1, yet it does not satisfy no veto
power. Hence we need to refer to Danilov (1992) and Yamato (1992) to answer
this question. Using the tools developed in these papers we can show that the core
correspondence is implementable. Before stating and proving the theorem, we have
the following lemma.
Lemma 1: For all R E R, p E C(R), and i E N we have E(C, i, L(p, R;)) = L(p, R,).
Proof: Let R E R, p E C(R),i E N. Let p' E E(C,i, L(p, R;)). Then there exists a
preference profile R' E R such that L(p', R) C L(p, R,) and therefore p' E L(p, R).
Hence
2. VkEN\i
(a) y'(k)R'kk
(b) Vl E Sk \{ p'(k)} kR'l
We have p' E C(R') and for all E L(p', R), (i) E {p'(i), }. Therefore p(i)Rip(i)
or equivalently p E L(p, R;) and hence L(p', R) C L(p, R;). This together with
p E C(R') implies that p' E E(C, i, L(i, R;)). Therefore
E(CiL( ,R,)) (6)
The relations (5) and (6) imply the desired result. Q.E.D.
Theorem 2: Let |NI> 3. Then the core correspondence is implementable.
Proof: Lemma 1 with monotonicity of the core correspondence (Proposition 1) im-
plies that the core is essentially monotonic. Therefore the core correspondence is
implementable by Yamato (1992). Q.E.D.
Remark 2: Kara and S5nmez (1993) show that the core correspondence is not
implementable on the class of marriage problems whenever |NI = 2. As negative
results are stronger in smaller classes this result extends to generalized matching
problems.
These results have an interesting implication in the housing market.
Corollary 1: Consider the housing market. The core correspondence is the only
single-valued matching rule which is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and im-
plementable.
Proof: Roth and Postlewaite (1977) show that the core correspondence is single-
valued in the context of the housing market. This together with Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2 imply the desired result. Q.E.D.E(C, i, L(p, R,)) C L(p, Rj)
Next let p' E L(p, R;). Let R' E 1Z be such that
1. (a) p'(i)R\i
(b) Vi E Si \ {i) jR'ip'(i)
(5)
11 12
References
[1] Alcalde, J., 1994, Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems,
Universitat d'Alacant working paper, forthcoming in Journal of Economic
Theory.
[2] Alcalde, J. and S. Barbera, 1994, Top dominance and the possibility of
strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems, Economic Theory 4,
417-435.
[3] Danilov, V., 1992, Implementation via Nash equilibria, Econometrica 60, 43-
56.
[4] Dutta, B. and A. Sen, 1991, A necessary and sufficient condition of two-person
Nash implementation, Review of Economic Studies 58, 121-128.
[5] Gale, D. and L. Shapley, 1962, College admissions and the stability of mar-
riage, American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9-15.
[6] Gibbard, A., 1973, Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result, Econo-
metrica 41, 587-601.
[7] Kara, T. and T. Sonmez, 1993, Nash implementation of matching rules, Uni-
versity of Rochester working paper, forthcoming in Journal of Economic The-
pry.
[8] Ma, J., 1994a, Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indi-
visibilities, International Journal of Game Theory 23, 75-83.
[9] Ma, J., 1994b, Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided
matching market, Hebrew University of Jerusalem working paper, forthcoming
in Journal of Economic Theory.
[10] Maskin, E., 1977, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, MIT working pa-
per.
[11] Maskin, E., 1985, The theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium: A sur-
vey, in: L.Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, and H. Sonnenschein eds., Social Goals
and Social Organization: Volume in Memory of Elisha Pazner (Cambridge
University Press, London / New York).
[12] Moore, J., 1992, Implementation in environments with complete information,
in: J.-J. Laffont ed., Advances in Economic Theory (Cambridge University
Press, London / New York).
[13] Moore, J. and R. Repullo, 1990, Nash implementation: A full characterization,
Econometrica 58, 1083-1099.
[14] Roth, A., 1982a, Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisibilities, Eco-
nomics Letters 9, 127-132.
[15] Roth, A., 1982b, The economics of matching: stability and incentives, Math-
ematics of Operations Research 7, 617-628.
[16] Roth, A. and A. Postlewaite, 1977, Weak versus strong domination in a market
with indivisible goods, Journal of Mathematical Economics 4, 131-137.
[17] Roth, A. and M. Sotomayor, 1990, Two-sided matching: A study in game
theoretic modeling and analysis, (Cambridge University Press, London / New
York).
[18] Saijo, T., 1988, Strategy space reductions in Maskin's theorem: Sufficient
conditions for Nash implementation, Econometrica 56, 693-700.
[19] Satterthwaite, M. A., 1975, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Exis-
tence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare
functions, Journal of Economic Theory 10, 187-216.
[20] Shapley, L. and H. Scarf, 1974, On cores and indivisibility, Journal of Mathe-
matical Economics 1, 23-28.
[21] Sjbstr6m, T., 1991, On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash imple-
mentation, Social Choice and Welfare 8, 333-340.
13 14
[22] Sonmez, T., 1994a, Strategy-proofness in many-to-one matching problems,
University of Michigan working paper.
[23] Sonmez, T., 1994b, Strategy-proofness and singleton cores in generalized
matching problems, University of Michigan working paper.
[24] Sprumont, Y., 1994, Strategyproof collective choice in economic and political
environments, CRDE, Universi6 de Montreal working paper, forthcoming in
Canadian Journal of Economics.
[25] Thomson, W., 1993, Concepts of implementation, University of Rochester
working paper.
[26] Thomson, W., 1994, Strategy-proof allocation rules, University of Rochester
working paper.
[27] Williams, S., 1986, Realization and Nash implementation: Two aspects of
mechanism design, Econometrica 54, 139-151.
[28] Yamato, T., 1992, On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences,
Games and Economic Behavior 4, 484-492.
0
15
